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Taylor and FrancisCIRA_A_288229.sgm10.1080/0 69 170701880601International Rev ew of Applied Economics0269-2171 (pri t)/1465-3486 (online)Original Articl2 08 & Francis000Ja u ry 2008GeraldEpstegepstein@econs.umass.edu Inflation targeting (IT) has recently become the dominant monetary policy prescription for both
developing and industrialized countries alike. Emerging market governments, in particular, are
increasingly pressured to follow IT as part of their International Monetary Fund (IMF)-led
stabilization packages and the routine rating procedures of the international finance institutions.
However, the common expectation of IT promoters that price stability would ultimately lead
to higher employment and sustained growth has failed to materialize. Generally, the current
growth patterns of the world economy are too concentrated and uneven to generate sufficient
capital investment and reduce unemployment. To contribute to the task of designing a more
socially desirable macroeconomic policy environment, we offer concrete country case studies
that devise viable alternatives to inflation targeting central bank policies in order to promote
employment, sustained growth and improved income distribution.
Keywords: inflation targeting; central banks
JEL classification: E31, E58
1. Introduction
Inflation targeting (IT) is the new orthodoxy of mainstream macroeconomic thought. The
approach has now been adopted by 24 central banks (CBs), and many more, including those in
developing countries, are expressing serious interest in following suit. Initially adopted by New
Zealand in 1990, the norms surrounding the IT regime have been so powerful that the central
banks of both the industrialized and the developing economies alike have declared that maintain-
ing price stability at the lowest possible rate of inflation is their only mandate. It has been gener-
ally believed that price stability is a pre-condition for sustained growth and employment, and that
‘high’ inflation, often defined as more that 5 or 6% per year, is damaging to the economy in the
long run.
In broad terms, the IT policy framework involves ‘the public announcement of inflation
targets, coupled with a credible and accountable commitment on the part of government policy
authorities to the achievement of these targets’ (Setterfield 2006: 653). In addition, inflation
targeting is usually associated with appropriate changes in the central bank law that enhances the
independence of the institution. In practice, while few central banks reach the ‘ideal’ of being
‘fully fledged’ inflation targeters, many others still focus on fighting inflation to the virtual exclu-
sion of other goals.
Ironically, employment creation has dropped off the direct agenda of most central banks just
as the problems of global unemployment, underemployment and poverty are taking center stage
as critical world issues (Heintz 2006). The International Labor Office (ILO) estimates that in 2003,
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approximately 186 million people were jobless, the highest level ever recorded (ILO 2004). The
employment to population ratio – a measure of unemployment – has fallen in the last decade, from
63.3 to 62.5% (ILO 2004). As the quantity of jobs relative to need has fallen, there is also a signif-
icant global problem with respect to the quality of jobs. The ILO estimates that 22% of the devel-
oping world’s workers earn less than US$1 a day and 1.4 billion (or 57% of the developing world’s
workers) earn less than US$2 a day. Moreover, China’s and India’s opening up to the global
markets and the collapse of the Soviet system together have added 1.5 billion new workers to the
world’s economically active population (Freeman 2004; Akyuz 2006). This means almost a
doubling of the global labor force and a reduction of the global capital–labor ratio by half. Under
these conditions, a large number of developing countries have suffered de-industrialization,
serious informalization, and consequent worsening of the position of wage-labor, resulting in a
deterioration of income distribution and increased poverty.
The key problem is that ongoing financial globalization appears primarily to redistribute
limited jobs across countries, rather than to accelerate capital accumulation and job creation
across the globe (Akyuz 2006; Epstein 2005; Adelman and Yeldan 2000). Current growth in
the global economy is highly uneven and geographically too concentrated to generate sufficient
jobs world-wide and, moreover, is associated with too little fixed capital formation. Under
these conditions, price stability, on its own, will not suffice to maintain true macroeconomic
stability, because, it will not secure financial stability and employment growth. In the words
of Akyuz (2006: 46), ‘… the source of macroeconomic instability now is not instability in
product markets but asset markets, and the main challenge for policy makers is not inflation,
but unemployment and financial instability’ (emphasis added). The sub-prime financial prob-
lems originating in the USA that are now spreading difficulties to many parts of the globe, is
only the latest in a series of episodes graphically illustrating the dangers of ignoring financial
instability.
While it might seem obvious that stabilization focused central bank policy represents the
only proper role for central banks, in fact, looking at history casts serious doubt on this claim.
Far from being the historical norm, in many of the successful currently developed countries, as
well as in many developing countries in the post-Second World War period, pursuing develop-
ment objectives was seen as a crucial part of most central banks’ tasks (Epstein 2007). Now, by
contrast, development has dropped off the policy agenda of central banks in most developing
countries.
The theme of this special issue and this introductory paper is that the modern central banking
ought to create more policy space to balance out various objectives while utilizing a broader
array of instruments. In particular, employment creation and more rapid economic growth should
join inflation and stabilization more generally as key goals of central bank policy. This paper
outlines why a shift away from inflation targeting, the increasingly fashionable, but problematic
approach to central bank policies, and a move toward a more balanced approach is both feasible
and desirable.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly survey the macro-
economic record of IT and its current structure. Section 3 focuses on the role of the exchange rate
as one of the key macro prices, and discusses alternative theories of its determination. We also
make remarks on the issue of inflation targeting in the context of the so-called ‘trilemma’ of
monetary policy. In Section 4 we discuss various alternatives to inflation focused central banks,
concentrating on the results of a multi-country research project undertaken with the support of the
United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs (UN-DESA), among other organiza-
tions. This section shows that there are viable, socially productive alternatives to inflation target-
ing, including those that focus on employment generation, and makes the case that these
alternatives should be further developed. Section 5 concludes.
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Table 1. Inflation targeting countries: initial conditions and modalities.
Developing countries











Israel 1997Q2 8.5 1–3 Headline O/N rate
Czech Republic 1998Q1 13.1 3 (±1) 2-week repo
Poland 1998Q4 9.9 2.5 (±1) 28-day intervention
Brazil 1999Q2 3.3 4.5 (±2) Selic O/N rate
Chile 1999Q3 2.9 2–4 O/N rate
Colombia 1999Q3 9.3 5 (±0.5) Repo
South Africa 2000Q1 2.3 3–6
Thailand 2000Q2 1.7 0–3.5 14-day repo
Korea 2001Q1 3.2 2.5–3.5 O/N call rate
Mexico 2001Q1 8.1 3 (±1) 91-day Cetes
Hungary 2001Q2 10.5 3.5 (±1) 2-week deposit
Peru 2002Q1 −0.8 2.5 (±1)
The Philippines 2002Q1 3.8 5–6 Reverse repo
Slovak Republic 2005Q1 3.2 3.5 (±1)
Indonesia 2005Q3 7.8 5.5 (±1) 1-month SBI
Romania 2005Q3 8.8 7.5 (±1)
Turkeya 2006Q1 7.8 5 (±2) CB O/N rate
Turkeyb 2001Q2 82.0 n.a. CB net domestic 
assets
Industrial countries
New Zealand 1990Q1 7.0 1–3 Cash rate
Canada 1991Q1 6.2 1–3 O/N funding rate
United Kingdom 1992Q4 3.6 2 Repo
Sweden 1993Q1 4.8 2 (±1) Repo
Australia 1993Q2 1.9 2–3 Cash rate
Iceland 2001Q1 3.9 2.5
Norway 2001Q1 3.7 2.5
Candidate countries
Costa Rica, Egypt, Ukrains Near term 
(1–2 years)
Albania, Armenia, Botswana, 
Dominican Republic, 
Gautemala, Mauritius, 
Uganda, Angola, Azerbaijian, 





Belarus, China, Kenya, Kyrgyz 
Republic, Moldova, Serbia, Sri 
Lanka, Vietnam, Zambia, 
Bolivia, Honduras, Nigeria, 




Source: Batini et al. (2006).
Notes: aOfficial adoption date for Turkey. bTurkish CB declared ‘disguised inflation targeting’ in the aftermath of the 
2001 February crisis. O/N, over-night interest rate; CB, Central Bank; SBI, 1-month Bank of Indonesia Certificates; n.a., 
not available.
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2. Macroeconomic record of IT
Much of the existing literature on the record of IT has focused on whether systemic risks and
accompanying volatility has been reduced in the IT economies, and whether inflation has come
down actually in response to adoption of the framework itself or as a result of a set of ‘exoge-
nously welcome’ factors. To be sure, there is a fair amount of agreement that IT has been associ-
ated with reductions in inflation. Furthermore, exchange rate pass-through effects were
reportedly reduced and consumer prices have become less prone to shocks (Edwards 2005;
Mishkin and Schmidt-Hebbel 2001). Yet, existing evidence also suggests that IT has not yielded
inflation below the levels attained by the industrial non-targeters that have adopted other mone-
tary regimes (Ball and Sheridan 2003; Roger and Stone 2005). Moreover, even if domestic
monetary policy has reduced inflation, the hoped for gains in employment have, generally, not
materialized; and, for many countries following this orthodox approach, economic growth has
not significantly increased.
On the ‘qualitative’ policy front, it is generally argued that with the onset of central bank inde-
pendence, communication and transparency have improved and the CBs have become more
‘accountable’. Yet, little is known about the true costs of IT on potential output growth, employ-
ment, and on incidence of poverty and income distribution. Bernanke et al. (1999) and Epstein
(2008), for instance, report evidence that inflation targeting central banks do not reduce inflation
at any lower cost than other countries’ central banks in terms of forgone output. That is, inflation
targeting does not appear to increase the credibility of central bank policy and therefore, does not
appear to reduce the sacrifice ratio. Per contra, based on an econometric study of a large sample
of inflation targeters and non-targeters, Corbo et al. (2001) concluded that sacrifice ratios have
declined in the emerging market economies after adoption of IT. They also report that output vola-
tility has fallen in both emerging and industrialized economies after adopting inflation targeting.
This position is recently complemented by a study of the International Monetary Fund (IMF) econ-
omists, who, using a complex econometric model and policy simulations, report findings that
inflation targeting economies experience reductions in the volatility in inflation, without experi-
encing increased volatility in real variables such as real gross domestic product (GDP) (Batini
et al. 2006). According to these estimates, inflation targeting central banks do enhance economic
‘stability’ relative to other monetary rules, such as pegged exchange rates and monetary rules.
However, in the assessments of ‘stability’, these papers do not consider the issue of the stabil-
ity of asset prices, including exchange rates, stock prices and other financial asset prices. As we
discuss further below, asset price stability may need to be included in a full analysis of the impact
of inflation targeting on overall economic stability.
Asset price stability aside, while intriguing, these results are only as strong as the simulation
model on which they are based and are only as relevant as the relevance of the questions they
pose. Moreover, they are only as broad as the alternatives they explore. On all these scores, these
results are problematic. First, they do not simulate the impact of inflation targeting relative to
other possible policy regimes, such as targeting the real exchange rate as discussed below.
Second, the model is based on estimates of potential output that are themselves affected by mone-
tary policy. Hence, if monetary policy slows economic growth, it also lowers the rate of growth
of potential output and, therefore reduces the gap between the two, thereby appearing to stabilize
the economy.
A further point pertains to the practical issue of setting the targeted rate of inflation itself.
Even if the advocated requisites of the IT regime are taken for granted, it is not yet clear what the
practically targeted rate of inflation should be. Even though there appears to be a consensus
among the advocates of the IT regime that the inflation target has to be ‘as low as possible’, there
is no theoretical guideline on the precise optimal numerical magnitude of the target itself; and as
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such, it smacks of more of an ideological claim than a careful calculation. Most disturbing is the
common belief that what is good for the industrialized/developed market economies should
simply be replicated by the developing countries as well. That this may not be the case is force-
fully argued in Pollin and Zhu (2006). Based on their non-linear regression estimates of the rela-
tionship between inflation and economic growth for 80 countries over the period 1961–2000,
Pollin and Zhu report that higher inflation is associated with moderate gains in GDP growth up
to a roughly 15–18% inflation threshold. Furthermore they report that there is no justification for
inflation-targeting policies as they are currently being practiced throughout the middle- and low-
income countries, that is, to maintain inflation with a 2–6% band.
Moreover, we have other evidence on the negative consequences of monetary policy designed
to produce extremely low levels of inflation in developing countries. Braunstein and Heintz show
that contractionary monetary policy used to fight inflation often has a differentially negative
impact on the employment rates of women relative to men (Braunstein and Heintz 2008).
Given the possible negative costs of inflation targeting on output and employment, there
should be some direct survey evidence indicating people’s preferences with respect to inflation
and unemployment. While some studies have indicated that people have an absolute preference
for low inflation, Arjun Jayadev (2008) reports on survey results asking people in different coun-
tries and income levels what is their bigger concern, high inflation or high unemployment. His
main result is that, in his sample, poorer people are more concerned about high unemployment
than high inflation, while richer respondents have the opposite preferences. Hence, concerns over
employment and inflation probably have an important class dimension to them, something that
economists and historians have suspected for many years, but which policy makers often claim
to be irrelevant.
An overall picture of the selected macroeconomic indicators of the inflation targeters can be
obtained from Tables 2 and 3. In Table 2, we provide information on the observed behavior of
selected macro aggregates as annual averages of 5 years before the adoption of the IT vs the
annual average after the adoption date to the current period. Table 3 keeps the same calendar
frames and reports data on key macro prices, viz. the exchange rate and interest rates.
As highlighted in the text, evidence on the growth performance of the IT countries is mixed.
Taking the numbers of Table 2 at face value, we see that seven of the 21 countries report a decline
in the average annual rate of real growth, while three countries (Canada, Hungary and Thailand)
have not experienced much of a shift in their rates of growth. Yet, clearly it is quite hard to disen-
tangle the effects of the IT regime from other direct and indirect effects on growth. One such
factor is the recent financial glut in the global asset markets and the associated surge of the house-
hold deficit spending bubble. The Institute of International Finance data reveal, for instance, that
the net capital inflows to the developing economies as a whole have increased from US$47 billion
in 1998, to almost US$400 billion in 2006, surpassing their peak before the Asian crisis of 1997.
As the excessive capital accumulation in telecommunications and the dot.com high tech indus-
tries phased out in the late 1990s, the global financial markets seem to have entered another phase
of expansion, and external effects such as these make it hard to isolate the growth impacts of the
IT regimes.
Despite the inconclusive verdict on the growth front, the figures on unemployment indicate
a significant increase in the post-IT era. Only three countries of our list (Chile, Mexico and
Switzerland) report a modest decline in their rates of unemployment in comparison to the pre-IT
averages. The deterioration of employment performance is especially pronounced (and puzzling)
in countries such as The Philippines, Peru and Turkey where rapid growth rates were attained.
The increased severity of unemployment at the global scale seems to have affected the IT-countries
equally strongly, and the theoretical expectation that ‘price stability would bring growth and
employment in the long run’ seems quite far from having materialized as of yet.
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The adjustment patterns on the balance of foreign trade have been equally diverse. Ten of the
21 countries in Table 2 achieved higher (improved) trade surpluses (balances). While there have
been large deficit countries such as Turkey, Mexico, The Philippines, and Australia, there were
also sizable surplus generators such as Brazil, Korea, Thailand, Canada, and Sweden. Not surpris-
ingly much of the behavior of the trade balance could be explained by the behavior of the real
exchange rates. This information is tabulated in Table 3.
Table 3, as previously in Table 2 above, calculates the annual averages of the five-year period
before the IT vs annual averages after IT to-date. Focusing on the inflation-adjusted real
exchange rate movements, we find a general tendency towards appreciated currencies in the after-
math of adoption of the IT regimes. Mexico, Indonesia, Korea and Turkey are the most significant
currency appreciating countries, while Brazil, and to some extent Colombia, have pursued active
export promotion strategies and maintained real depreciation. The Czech Republic, Switzerland












started Before After Before After Before After Before After
New Zealand 1990 2.7 3.0 4.2 6.9 0.4 1.3 2897.9 4623.2
Canada 1991 2.9 2.8 8.4 8.7 0.5 2.7 11,964.0 24,256.0
UK 1992 2.2 2.7 7.4 5.2 −2.5 −1.6 39,666.5 37,408.5
Sweden 1993 0.8 2.7 2.8 6.1 1.3 6.2 15,399.0 18,521.8
Australia 1994 2.2 3.9 8.6 7.3 −0.6 −1.3 13,777.9 20,337.1
Israel 1997 5.8 3.1 8.5 9.4 −14.6 −7.2 7567.3 24,421.1
Czech Republica 1998 4.5 3.2 4.0 8.9 −3.4 −1.8 9172.5 21,686.5
Poland 1998 7.9 3.7 14.3 16.7 0.0 −4.1 12,591.8 31,581.8
Brazilb 1999 3.2 2.3 7.0 9.8 −1.7 1.0 47,701.3 42,304.5
Colombia 1999 3.3 2.3 11.1 15.8 −6.0 −0.5 7567.3 24,421.1
Mexico 1999 1.7 4.8 2.7 1.9 −0.5 −1.9 20,630.9 51,396.6
South Africac 2000 2.6 3.8 n.a. 27.7 0.0 0.0 15,860.0 9580.0
Switzerland 2000 1.4 1.7 4.1 3.1 0.1 0.1 38,277.1 40,646.5
Thailand 2000 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.4 0.0 0.1 32,556.1 40,474.8
Korea 2001 4.6 4.5 4.4 3.7 0.0 0.0 55,299.5 157,739.2
Hungary 2001 4.2 4.2 8.0 6.1 −1.3 −2.9 9918.1 13,652.1
Perud 2002 2.0 5.2 7.8 10.2 −3.2 −0.4 9264.8 11,222.9
Philippines 2002 3.1 5.1 10.2 11.5 −3.6 −0.7 11,282.6 14,006.6
Indonesia 2005 4.6 5.6 6.5 10.3 7.3 −4.6 31,326.7 32,989.2
Turkeye 2006 4.5 7.8 9.9 10.4 −9.8 −11.0 33,237.4 56,990/4
Turkeyf 2001Q2 4.0 4.5 6.6 10.0 −7.5 −9.8 20,083.4 33237.4
Source: IMF Statistics and Asian Development Bank.
Notes: aThe period before the inflation targeting refers to the period of 1994–1997 for ‘growth’ and ‘CPI inflation’ for the Czech 
Republic. bThe period before the inflation targeting refers to the period of 1996–1998 for reserves in Brazil. cThe period before 
the inflation targeting refers to the period of 1994–1997 and after inflation targeting refers to the period 1999–2004 for 
unemployment rate in South Africa. Note that due to change in methodology and data coverage, unemployment figures are not 
directly comparable before and after apartheid. dThe period before the inflation targeting refers to the period of 2003–2004 for 
unemployment rate in Peru. Official adoption date for Turkey is 2006. However, Turkish CB declared ‘disguised inflation 
targeting’ in the aftermath of the 2001 February crisis.
Before, Annual average of 5 years prior to adoption; After, annual averages from the time of adoption of IT until the most recent 
period for which data are available.
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and Hungary are observed to have experienced currency appreciation, and Poland seems to have
maintained an appreciating path for its real exchange rate.
Clearly much of this generalized trend towards appreciation can be explained by the
increased expansion of foreign capital inflows owing to the global financial glut mentioned
above. With the IT central bankers announcing a ‘no-action’ stance against exchange rate move-
ments led by the ‘markets’, a period of expansion in the global asset markets has generated strong














started Before After Before After Before After Before After
New Zealand 1990 11.6 2.2 −7.8 −0.6 7.0 5.5 2.1 5.1
Chilea 1991 19.7 7.2 −6.0 −4.0 … 0.0 −16.0 −4.6
Canada 1991 4.5 2.1 −7.5 −1.7 6.0 2.6 5.8 2.5
UK 1992 6.4 2.6 −2.4 −2.2 5.4 3.0 5.0 2.8
Sweden 1993 6.9 1.5 −8.5 1.2 2.8 1.7 5.0 2.9
Australiab 1994 4.2 2.5 −6.9 −1.1 7.1 3.2 6.3 4.0
Israel 1997 11.3 3.1 −4.2 0.9 2.0 5.0 1.5 5.0
Czech Republicc 1998 9.1 3.1 −6.6 −6.2 1.9 0.7 0.0 0.9
Polandd 1998 24.1 4.7 −4.5 −4.6 1.6 6.2 1.8 11.6
Brazil 1999 819.2 7.9 −428.0 5.5 −782.6 15.7 −786.9 12.4
Colombia 1999 20.4 7.5 −9.5 0.5 18.4 6.6 1.5 2.0
Mexico 1999 24.5 7/2 2.8 −4.6 7.5 5.0 3.2 3.8
Thailand 2000 5.1 2.2 4.5 −1.0 4.9 1.6 4.7 3.1
South Africae 2000 7.3 5.1 4.3 −2.5 8.6 4.4 7.3 4.2
Switzerland 2000 0.8 1.0 1.6 −3.7 0.2 0.1 0.9 0.3
Korea 2001 4.0 3.3 6.0 −5.0 −0.2 −1.0 6.5 2.1
Hungary 2001 15.2 5.9 2.5 −12.4 2.0 3.4 2.3 3.4
Perud 2002 5.0 1.9 −1.6 1.4 9.3 2.0 3.8 −0.5
Philippines 2002 6.3 5.0 8.7 −3.0 5.1 0.9 5.2 1.2
Indonesia 2005 8.0 10.5 −6.2 −1.9 4.2 2.3 4.1 −2.4
Turkeyf 2006 28.3 10.5 −6.3 −8.2 11.7 7.5 14.8 10.5
Turkeyf 2001Q2 74.1 28.3 −3.9 −6.3 −13.3 12.7 23.9 15.5
Source: IMF statistics.
Notes: 1A rise in value indicates depreciation. Annual average market rate is used for: UK Canada, turkey, Australia, 
New Zealand, Brazil, Peru, Indonesia, Korea, and the Philippines. Annual average official rate is used for: Colombia, 
Thailand, Hungary, Poland, and Switzerland. Principle rate is used for: South Africa, Mexico, and the Czech Republic. 
2Nominal values are deflated by the corresponding inflation averages (CPI column). 3Sweden, New Zealand, Canada, 
bank rate; Mexico, banker’s acceptance. 4Colombia, Interbankaria TBS; Peru and Chile, savings rate; New Zealand, 
newly issued 3 months Treasury bill rates; Indonesia, 3 months deposit rate; Korea, National Housing bond rate; 
Thailand, Government bond yield rate.
aThe period after the inflation targeting refers to the period of 1993–2005; the period before the inflation targeting refers 
to the period of 1987–1990. bTreasury Bill, the period after the inflation targeting refers to the period of 1994–2000; CB 
rate, the period after the inflation targeting refers to the period of 1994–1995. cThe period before the inflation targeting 
refers to the period of 1994–1997. dTreasury Bill rates, the period after the inflation targeting refers to the period of 
1998–2000. eTreasury Bill, the period before the inflation targeting refers to the period of 1994–2000. fOfficial adoption 
date for Turkey is 2006. However, CB declared ‘disguised inflation targeting’ in the aftermath of the 2001 February 
crisis.
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tendencies for currency appreciation. What is puzzling, however, is the rapid and very significant
expansion in the foreign exchange reserves reported by the IT central banks. As reported in the
last two columns of Table 2 above, foreign exchange reserves held at the CBs rose significantly
in the aftermath of the IT regimes. The rise of reserves was especially pronounced in Korea, The
Philippines and Israel where almost a five-fold increase had been witnessed. Of all the countries
surveyed in Table 3, UK and Brazil are the only two countries that had experienced a fall in their
aggregate reserves.1
This phenomenon is puzzling because the well-celebrated ‘flexibility’ of the exchange rate
regimes were advocated precisely with the argument that, under the IT framework, the CBs would
gain freedom in their monetary policies and would no longer need to hold reserves to defend a
targeted rate of exchange. In the absence of any officially stated exchange rate target, the need for
holding such sums of foreign reserves at the CBs should have been minimal. The proponents of
the IT regimes argue that the CBs need to hold reserves to ‘maintain price stability against possible
shocks’. Yet, the acclaimed ‘defense of price stability’ at the expense of such large and costly
funds that are virtually kept idle at the IT central banks’ reserves is questionable in an era of
prolonged unemployment and slow investment growth, and needs to be justified more fully.
We now turn to the issue of exchange rate policy in an IT framework more formally.
3. The role of the exchange rate under IT
As stated above, among the oft-stated requirements of the IT system is the implementation of a
‘floating/flexible’ exchange rate system in the context of free mobility of capital. In this context,
central bank ‘policy’ has typically been reduced to merely ‘setting the policy interest rate’. The
role of the exchange rate as an adjustment variable has clearly increased over the last decade since
the adoption of the floating exchange rate systems. In the meantime, however, the role of the
interest rates and reserve movements has declined substantially as counter-cyclical instruments
available to be used against shocks2 (see Table 2 above).
Against this background a number of practical and conceptual questions are inevitable: what
is the role of the exchange rate in the overall macroeconomic policy when an explicit inflation
targeting regime is adopted? Under what conditions should the central bank, or any other author-
ity, react to shocks in the foreign exchange market? Also, perhaps more importantly, if an inter-
vention in the foreign exchange market is regarded necessary against, say, the disruptive effects
of an external shock, for example, speculative capital inflows, what are the proper instruments?
To the proponents of IT, the answer to these questions is simple and straightforward: the CB
should not have any objective in mind with regards to the level of the exchange rate, yet it might
interfere against the volatility of the exchange rate in so far as it affects the stability of prices.
However, nuances remain. For what may be grouped under ‘strict IT conformists’, the CB should
be concerned with the exchange rate only it affects its ability to forecast and target price inflation.
Any other response to the foreign exchange market represents a departure from the IT system.
Advocated in the seminal works by Bernanke et al. (1999) and Fischer (2001), the approach
argues that attending to inflation targeting and reacting to the exchange rate are mutually exclu-
sive. Beyond this assertion, the conformist view also holds that intervention in the foreign
exchange market could confuse the public regarding the ultimate objective of the central bank
with respect to its priorities, distorting expectations. In a world of a financial credibility game,
such signals would be detrimental to the CB’s authority.
Yet, while maintaining the IT objective, one can also distill a more active role for the
exchange rate in the literature. As outlined in Debelle (2001) and Ho and McCauley (2003), this
‘flexible IT’ view proposes that the exchange rate can also be a legitimate policy objective along-
side the inflation target. More formally, an operational framework for the ‘flexible IT’ view was
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envisaged within an expanded Taylor rule. Taylor (2000) argued, for instance, that an exchange
rate policy rule can legitimately be embedded in a monetary rule that is consistent with the broad
objectives of targeted inflation rate and the output gap.
In contrast to all this, the structuralist tradition asserts that irrespective of the conditionalities
of foreign capital and boundaries of IT, it is very important for the developing economies to main-
tain a stable and competitive real exchange rate (SCRER) (see, e.g. Frenkel 2006; Frenkel and
Taylor 2006; Frenkel and Ros 2006; Frenkel and Rapetti 2008). They argue that the real exchange
rate can affect employment, and the economy more generally, through a number of channels:
(1) by affecting the level of aggregate demand (the macroeconomic channel); (2) by affecting the
cost of labor relative to other goods and thereby affecting the amount of labor hired per unit of
output (the labor intensity channel); and (3) by affecting employment through its impact on
investment and economic growth (the development channel). While the size and even direction
of these channel effects might differ from country to country, maintaining a competitive and
stable real exchange rate is likely to have a positive employment impact though some combina-
tion of these effects.
The general analytics of the SCRER within the context of an IT central bank is investigated
in Cordero (2008). The gist of the structuralist case for SCRER, however, rests on a recent (and
unfortunately not well understood and appreciated) paper by Taylor (2004). Resting his arguments
on the system of social accounting identities, Taylor argues that the exchange rate can not be
regarded as a simple ‘price’ determined by temporary macro equilibrium conditions. The main-
stream case for exchange rate determination rests on the well-celebrated Mundell (1963) and
Fleming (1962) model where the model rests on an assumed duality between reserves (fixed
exchange rate system) vs flexible exchange rate adjustments. The orthodox mainstream model,
according to Taylor, presupposes that a balance of payments exists with a potential disequilibrium
that has to be cleared. This, however, is a false presumption. The exchange rate is not an ‘inde-
pendent’ price and has no fundamentals such as a given real rate of return (or a trade deficit) that
can make it self-stabilizing. In Taylor’s (2004: 212) words, ‘… the balance of payments is at most
an accumulation rule for net foreign assets and has no independent status as an equilibrium condi-
tion. The Mundell–Fleming duality is irrelevant, and in temporary equilibrium, the exchange rate
does not depend on how a country operates its monetary (especially international reserve) policy’.
Within the mainstream orthodoxy, the major policy implication of the Mundell–Fleming
duality is the so-called ‘trilemma’, which commands that central banks can only have two out of
three of the following: open capital markets, a fixed exchange rate system, and an autonomous
monetary policy geared toward domestic goals. While this so-called ‘trilemma’ is not strictly true
as a theoretical matter, in practice it does raise serious issues of monetary management. From our
perspective, the real crux of the problem turns out to be the very narrow interpretation of the
constraints of the trilemma: CBs are often thought to be restricted to choose two ‘points’ out of
three. Yet, the constraints of the trilemma could as well be regarded as the boundaries of a contin-
uous set of policies, as would emerge out of a bounded, yet continuous depiction of a ‘policy
triangle’. Thus, even within the boundaries of the trilemma a menu of choices does exist, ranging
from administered exchange rate regimes to capital management/control techniques. In fact,
many successful developing countries have used a variety of capital management techniques to
manage these flows in order, among other things, to help them escape the rigid constraints of the
so-called ‘trilemma’ (Ocampo 2002; Epstein, Grabel and Jomo 2005).
4. Socially responsible alternatives to inflation targeting central bank policies
Given the theoretical, empirical and policy problems associated with strict inflation targeting
there is a major need for clear and concrete monetary policy alternatives that can achieve more
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socially desirable outcomes. Developing such alternatives has been the motivation for the multi-
country research project whose main results are described in this special issue. In this section we
briefly summarize some of the key findings of this series of country studies undertaken by a
team of researchers working on a Political Economy Research Institute (PERI) (University of
Massachusetts, Amherst)/Bilkent project on alternatives to inflation targeting. More detail can
be found in the papers that follow.
A range of alternatives to inflation targeting were developed by these researchers, from
modest changes in the targeting framework to allow for more focus on exchange rates and a
change in the index of inflation used, to a much broader change in the overall mandate of the
central bank to a focus on employment targeting, rather than inflation targeting.
It has to be noted at the outset that ‘inflation control’ is identified as among the crucial ultimate
objectives in all country studies summarized below. Thus, there is a clear consensus among the
authors that controlling inflation is important and desirable. At the same time, all agree that the
current prescription insisting on ‘very low’ rates of inflation at the 2–4% band is not warranted,
and that responsibilities of the central banks, particularly in developing countries, must be broader
than that. Accordingly, the policy matrix of the CBs should include other crucial ‘real’ variables
that have a direct impact on employment, poverty, and economic growth, such as the real
exchange rate and/or investment allocation. They also agree that in many cases, central banks
must broaden their available policy tools to allow them to reach multiple goals, including, if
necessary, the implementation of capital management techniques.
4.1. Modest but socially responsible adjustments to the inflation targeting regime
Some of the country studies in the PERI/Bilkent project proposed only modest changes to the
inflation targeting regime. In the case of Mexico, for example, the authors argue that the inflation
targeting regime has allowed for more flexible monetary policy than had occurred under regimes
with strict monetary targets or strict exchange rate targets (Galindo and Ros 2008). They suggest
modifying the IT framework to make it somewhat more employment friendly. In the case of
Mexico, Galindo and Ros find that monetary policy was asymmetric with respect to exchange rate
movements – tightening when exchange rates depreciated, but not loosening when exchange rates
appreciated. This lent a bias in favor of an over-valued exchange rate in Mexico. So they propose
a ‘neutral’ monetary policy so that the central bank of Mexico responds symmetrically to exchange
rate movements and thereby avoids the bias toward over-valuation without fundamentally chang-
ing the inflation targeting framework. In their own words, ‘the central bank would promote a
competitive exchange rate by establishing a sliding floor to the exchange rate in order to prevent
excessive appreciation (an “asymmetric band …”). This would imply intervening in the foreign
exchange market at times when the exchange rate hits the floor (i.e. an appreciated exchange rate)
but allows the exchange rate to float freely otherwise.’ They point out that such a floor would work
against excessive capital inflows by speculators because they would know the central bank will
intervene to stop excessive appreciation. If need be, Galindo and Ros also propose temporary capi-
tal controls, as do some of the other authors from the PERI/Bilkent project.
In his study of Brazil, Nelson Barbosa-Filho (2008) also proposed extending the inflation
targeting framework, but in a more dramatic way. According to Barbosa-Filho because of
Brazil’s past experience with high inflation, the best policy is to continue to target inflation while
the economy moves to a more stable macroeconomic situation. However, the crucial question is
not to eliminate inflation targeting, but actually make it compatible with fast income growth and
a stable public and foreign finance (Barbosa-Filho 2008).
Given Brazil’s large public debt, Barbosa-Filho proposes that the targeted reduction in the
real interest rate would reduce the Brazilian debt service burdens and help increase productive
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investment. In terms of the familiar targets and instruments framework, he proposes that the
Brazilian central bank choose exports, inflation and investment as ultimate targets, and focus on
the inflation rate, a competitive and stable real exchange rate and the real interest rate as interme-
diate targets. Furthermore, in order to achieve these goals, the central bank can use direct manip-
ulation of the policy interest rate, bank reserve requirements and bank capital requirements.
Brazil is not the only highly indebted country in our project sample. Turkey is another case
with that problem. Here, too, the authors raise concerns about the conformist straightjacket of
inflation targeting, and develop an alternative macroeconomic framework. Using a financial-
linked computable general equilibrium model (CGE) for the case of Turkey, Telli, Voyvoda and
Yeldan (2008) illustrate the real and financial sectoral adjustments of the Turkish economy under
the conditionalities of twin targets: on the primary surplus to GNP ratio and on the inflation rate.
They utilize their model to study the impact of a shift in policy from a strict inflation targeting
regime, to one that calls for revisions of the primary fiscal surplus targets in favor of a more
relaxed fiscal stance on public investments on social capital, together with a direct focus on the
competitiveness of the real exchange rate. They further study the macroeconomics of a labor tax
reform implemented through reduction of the payroll tax burden on the producers, and an active
monetary policy stance via reduction of the central bank’s interest rates. They report significant
employment gains due to a policy of lower employment taxes. They also find that the economy’s
response to the reduction of the CB’s interest rate is positive in general yet, very much dependent
on the path of the real exchange rate; thus they also call for maintaining a stable real exchange
rate path à la Frenkel, Rapetti, Ros and Taylor.
Frenkel and Rapetti (2008), in the case of Argentina, show that targeting a stable and
competitive real exchange rate has been very successful in helping to maintain more rapid
economic growth and employment generation. In the case of India, Jha (2008) also argues
against an inflation targeting regime, and in favor of one that ‘errs on the side of undervaluation
of the exchange rate’ with possible help from temporary resort to capital controls. Jha argues,
that, to some extent, such a policy would be a simple continuation of policies undertaken in India
in the past.
4.2. More comprehensive alternatives to inflation targeting
Other country case studies propose more comprehensive policy alternatives to simple inflation-
focused monetary policy, including inflation targeting. Joseph Lim (2008) proposes a compre-
hensive alternative to inflation targeting for the case of the Philippines. He argues that the
Philippine government has been seeking to achieve a record of dramatically higher economic
growth, but that its monetary policy has been inadequate to achieve that goal. He therefore
proposes an ‘alternative’ that ‘clearly dictates much more than just a move from monetary target-
ing to inflation targeting’ with the following proposals: (1) Maintenance of a competitive real
exchange rate, either by pegging the exchange rate or intensively managing it as in South Korea.
(2) Implementation of capital management techniques, as in China and Malaysia, to help manage
the exchange rates. This should include strong financial supervision to prevent excessive under-
taking of short-term foreign debt, and tax based capital controls on short term capital flows, as
was used, for example in Chile. (3) An explicit statement of output and employment goals, as the
central bank transits from a purely inflation-targeting regime. (4) Incomes and anti-monopoly
policies to limit inflation to moderate levels and (5) Targeted credit programs, especially for
export oriented and small and medium sized enterprises that can contribute to productivity
growth and employment.
These policy proposals in broad outlines are similar to those proposed by Epstein (2008) for
the case of South Africa, which, in turn, have been developed in a much broader framework and
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in more detail by Pollin et al. (2006). Pollin et al. developed an ‘employment-targeted economic
program’ designed to accomplish this goal, with a focus on monetary policy, credit policy, capital
management techniques, fiscal policy and industrial policy. The purpose of the program is to
reduce unemployment rate by half in line with the government’s pledge to reduce the official
unemployment rate to 13% by 2014.3 Here, ‘employment targeting’ replaces inflation targeting
as the proposed operating principle behind central bank policy, and moderate inflation becomes
an additional formal constraint which the central bank must take into account when formulating
its policies.
5. Concluding comments
In this overview paper we have argued that the current day orthodoxy of central banking – namely,
that the top priority goal for central banks is to keep inflation in the low single digits – is, in general,
neither optimal nor desirable. This orthodoxy is based on several false premises: first, that
inflation, in any magnitude, has high costs; second, that in a low inflation environment, economies
will naturally perform best, and in particular, will generate high levels of economic growth and
employment generation; and third, that there are no viable alternatives to this ‘inflation-focused’
monetary policy.
In fact, moderate rates of inflation have very low or no costs; and countries where central
banks have predicted IT have not generally performed better in terms of economic growth or
employment generation and in many cases have performed worse. Moreover, there are viable
alternatives to inflation targeting, historically, presently, and looking forward.
Historically, countries both in the currently developed and developing worlds had central
banks with multiple goals and tools, and pursued broad developmental as well as stabilization
goals. Currently, very successful economies such as Argentina, China and India have central
banks that are using a broad array of tools to manage their economies for developmental
purposes. Looking forward, the PERI/Bilkent project on alternatives to inflation targeting and
PERI’s work on South Africa, have developed an array of ‘real targeting’ approaches to central
banking which we believe are viable alternatives to inflation targeting and, in particular, do a
better job than mere inflation targeting in balancing the developmental and stabilization functions
of central banks.
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Notes
1. Brazil’s case is actually explained in part by the recent decision (late 2005) of the Lula government to
close its debt arrears with the IMF with early payments out of its reserves.
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2. Though, note the one sided increases in the aggregate reserves of the CBs. The social desirability and
economic optimality of this phenomenon in the aftermath of the adoption of floating exchange rate
systems is another issue that warrants further research.
3. As of March 2005, South Africa had an unemployment rate of anywhere from 26 to 40%, depending on
exactly how it is counted.
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